Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2007

The State of Utah by and through its Treasurer v.
Spring City, a municipal corporation, and Hyrum
Jensen, its Mayor, Claude Acord, Royal Allred,
Cutler Schofield, Henry Schofield and Virgus
Osborne, its Councilmen, and charles A.
Thompsen, Royal Allred, Virgus Osborne, Max
Blain, Lowell Hansen, Allen Beck and Henry Blaine
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
E. R. Callister; Attorney General; S. D. Huffaker; Deputy Attorney General; Ken Chamberlain;
Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellant .
Unknown.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Spring City, No. 7942.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2685

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Ultttt bUiJKL:,i\1E COURT
XDUMENT
r

u

BRIEF

.9
)CKET NO.

l°HZh
THE SUPREME Cdukr
of the
jJ
STATE OF UTAH]

THE STATE OF UTAH by and
through its Treasurer,
Plamtiff and Appellant.
— vs.—
SPRING CITY, a municipal corporation, and HYRUM JENSEN, its
Mayor, CLAUDE ACORD, ROYAL
ALLRED, CUTLER SCHOFIELD, > Civil No. 7942
HENRY SCHOFIELD and VIRGUS
OSBORNE, its Councilmen, and
CHARLES A. THOMPSEN, ROYAL
ALLRED, VIRGUS OSBORNE,
MAX BLAIN, LOWELL HANSEN,
ALLEN BECK and HENRY BLAIN,
Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
S. D. HUFFAKER
Deputy Attorney General
KEN CHAMBERLAIN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Pages
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1, 2

PLEADINGS

2,3,4

PROCEEDINGS

.-...

EVIDENCE
STATEMENT OF POINTS

4,5
5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10,11
12

ARGUMENT
POINT I :

12-47
THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15,
1948, ISSUED BY THE DEFENDANT
SPRING CITY ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND VALID
1.

12-13

The debt limit imposed by Article XIV,
Section 3, Constitution of Utah, was
not exceeded
The debt limit imposed by Article XIV,
Section 4, was not exceeded

27-31

THE CITY COUNCIL OF DEFENDANT
SPRING CITY WAS AUTHORIZED AND
EMPOWERED TO BORROW, UPON NEGOTIABLE BONDS, FUNDS TO BE
USED FOR CORPORATE PURPOSES

31-33

POINT I I I : IF THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY
15, 1948, BE VOID IN THE ABSENCE
OF AN ELECTION AUTHORIZING
THAT ISSUE, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER UPON THE
THEORY OF MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED

33-43

POINT IV: IF THE BOND ISSUE IS VOID, THE
PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER AGAINST
THE ISSUING AUTHORITIES BECAUSE OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF
THOSE OFFICIALS IN AUTHORIZING
THE ISSUE

43-47

CONCLUSION

47-49

2.
POINT I I :

13-27

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
CASES CITED
Bank of Cameron vs. Aleppo Township, 13 Atl. 2d 40, 338
Penn. 300, (1940)
37
Board of Education, Rich County School District vs. Passey,
246 Pac. 2d 1078
29
Commercial Trust Company of Hagerstown vs. Laurens
County, 267 Fed. 901 (D.C., S.D. Georgia W.D. 1920)

35

Craig, et al vs. Bell, et al, 46 SE 2d 52 (1948)

38

Dickinson vs. Salt Lake City, et al, 57 Utah 530, 195 P. 1110.... 20
First National Bank of Key West vs. Filer et al (Fla. 1933),
145 So. 204, 87 A.L.R. 267
45, 46
Fjeldsted vs. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P. 2d 144

26

Fritch vs. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 15
Utah 83, 47 Pac. 1026
14,17,18
Lawrence County vs. Lawrence Fiscal Court, 130 Ky. 587,
113 S.W. 824
24, 25
McGregors Estate vs. Young Township, 38 Atl. 2d 313, 350
Penn. 93, (1949)

38

Moe vs. Millard County School District, 54 Utah 144, 179 P.
980
.40,41
Muir vs. Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 Pac. 433

15,19, 20,
21,41,42

Octonoco County vs. The Town of Townsend, 246 NW 410
(Wise. 1933)

39

Olds vs. Town of Bellair, 41 F. Supp. 453 (1941)

36

Pleasant Valley Coal Company vs. County Commissioners,
Salt Lake County, 15 Utah 97, 48 Pac. 1032
17,18
Scott, County Auditor vs. Salt Lake County, et al, 58 Utah 25,
196 P. 1022
21,25
State Board of Land Comrs. vs. Ririe, 56 Utah 213, 190
Pac. 5 9 .
Wilson vs. Gaston (1914) 141 Ga. 770, 82 S.E. 136

30

22,24

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Pages
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
REFERENCES
Constitution of Utah :
Article XIV, Sec. 3

.

Article XIV, Sec. 4

.

-

10,12,13,19
29,27,28,30
35,48
10,12, 27, 28
29,30,31

....

Utah Code Annotated 1943:
Sec. 15-8-6 [Now 10-8-6, U.C.A. 1953] .. . 1 . . . . .
Sec. 104-2-24 (3) [Now 78-12-26 (3) U.C.A. 1953]
Sec. 104-2-24 (10) [Now 78-12-26 (4) U.C.A. 1953]
Utah Code Annotated 1953:
Sec. 10-7-9

... ..

Sec. 10-8-2
Sec. 10-8-6

.

.-..

:

7
4
4
24
32
32

Sec. 10-8-14

32

Sec. 10-8-87

24

Sec. 59-5-1

30

Sec. 78-25-1 (3)

30

Chapter 8, Title 10

32

MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCES
Abstracts & Briefs, Vol. 277, Muir vs. Murray City [Cases
No. 3356-3374] Utah State Library
State Tax Commission records of overall state property tax
assessments 1945 - 1949

42
31

TEXTS CITED
2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th Edition, P. 1547, Sec.
961
41 A.L.R., Page 810
43 Am. Jur., Public Securities & Obligations, Sec. 11, 13
43 Am. Jur., Pages 493-495
43 Am. Jur., Public Securities & Obligations, Sec. 39
43 Am. Jur., Public Securities & Obligations, Sec. 40

33
21
26
26
32
33

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH by and
through its Treasurer,
Plaintiff and Appellant.
— vs. —
SPEING CITY, a municipal corporation, and HYEUM JENSEN, its
Mayor, CLAUDE ACOED, EOYAL
ALLBED, CUTLEE SCHOFIELD,
HENEY SCHOFIELD and VIEGUS
OSBOENE, its Councilmen, and
CHARLES A. THOMPSEN, EOYAL
ALLEED, V I E G U S OSBOENE,
MAX BLAIN, LOWELL HANSEN,
ALLEN BECK and HENEY BLAIN,
Defendants and Respondents.

civil No. 7942

BEIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree in
favor of the several defendants, respondents here, entered
and filed October 24,1952 (E. pp. 46, 47), based upon the
trial court's written findings of fact and conclusions of
law (E. pp. 33-45) and dismissing plaintiff's complaint
as well as declaring certain bonds issued by the defendant Spring City to be unconstitutional, void, and unDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

collectible. For convenience the parties will be referred
to as they appeared in the court below.
After a pre-trial, at which witnesses were sworn
and testified, the case was submitted to the trial court
for determination and decision by all parties upon the
record there made. No jury was called or impaneled.
PLEADINGS
The complaint, as amended (K. pp. 26-30) alleged
that the defendant Spring City, a municipal corporation,
on January 15,1948, issued, in a series of that date, negotiable coupon general obligation power and light bonds
in the face amount of $12,000.00, and in the form set forth
as the complaint's exhibit "A"; that to the bonds were
attached coupons for interest; and that the plaintiff,
the State of Utah, by its Commission of Finance, paid
the sum of $13,498.67 for those bonds, representing
principal, premium, and accrued interest; that the money
was received by defendant Spring City, and used for
corporate purposes. The complaint alleged that the defendants, Charles A. Thompsen, as mayor, Koyal Allred,
Virgus Osborne, Max Blain, Lowell Hansen and Allen
Beck, as councilmen, and Henry Blain as recorder, were
the duly elected, qualified and acting holders of those
respective offices as they were constituted in the month
of January 1948. All of the foregoing allegations were
conceded, and incorporated into the findings.
The complaint further alleged, in six counts, grounds
for relief upon the following causes of action: One, default in the payment of interest upon presentation of
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certain coupons as they matured; Two, an assertion by
the council of Spring City to the effect that the bonds
to which the coupons were attached were themselves void;
Three, that the State of Utah paid the sum of $13,498.67
to the defendant Spring City under a mistake of fact,
which mistake arose from the misrepresentation by the
several individual defendants, then officials of the defendant Spring City, of certain material facts affecting
the constitutionality of the disputed issue; Four, that
those officials falsely and negligently misrepresented
the facts upon which the alleged mistake was made; Five,
that the defendant Henry Blain, City Eecorder in January, 1948, misrepresented the financial condition of the
city, upon which representation the plaintiff relied, to its
detriment, and, in the event the disputed securities be
declared void, to its damage; Six, that the defendant
Spring City had and received from, to the use of, and
therefore owes, the plaintiff, State of Utah, the sum of
$13,498.67.
Separate answers were filed by the defendant Spring
City, and by the several individual defendants, who joined
in one answer. Spring City in its answer denied that
general obligation bonds, or legal bonds of any kind, were
issued; denied that there was a fraudulent or actionable
misrepresentation, and alleged that the bonds were void,
having been issued pursuant to no election by qualified
taxpayers and electors, and that the bonds were not
within the revenues of the year in which issued. That
there are no funds presently or potentially available
through taxation or otherwise for the payment of the
3
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alleged debt The defendant Spring City counterclaimed
for interest theretofore paid by that defendant to the
plaintiff.
In the joint answer of the several individual defendants, they deny the validity of the bonds; deny generally any actionable misrepresentation, or that there
was any mistake or fraud in the inducement of the purchase of these bonds, and deny generally that the plaintiff states a claim against the individual defendants upon
which relief might be granted; that the action is barred as
against those defendants by the provisions of Section 1042-24 (3) and Section 104-2-24.10, UCA 1943. [Now 7812-26 (3) and (4) UCA 1953] Two of the individual defendants, however, by express reservation in their answer, do not deny the validity of the bond's. Those defendants, Royal Allred and Virgus Osborne, were in 1948,
and now are, members of the city council of the defendant Spring City.
Issue was joined upon the validity of the bonds, the
validity of coupons thereon, the presence of a cause of
action for money had and received, and the personal
liability of the several individual defendants.
PROCEEDINGS
At the pre-trial hearing, the mayor, members of the
city council and the recorder of the defendant Spring
City, as those offices were constituted at the time of the
issuance of the questioned securities, were sworn and
testified. Exhibits were submitted, stipulated to and admitted into evidence. The evidence adduced by the exam-
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ination of the several witnesses was, as far as is material
here, incontroverted.' ••
The Honorable L. Leland Larson, District Judge of
the Seventh Judicial District, conducted pre-trial proceedings October 17, 1951. The pre-trial proceedings
were continued until November 9, 1951, the court requiring the attendance of all defendants for examination
upon the pre-trial. On November 9, 1951, the matter was
submitted for decision and determination by the trial
court.
EVIDENCE
The facts before the court are substantially as follows : The defendant Spring City, is a duly incorporated
city of the third class in Sanpete County, Utah. In the
year 1947, the assessed valuation of defendant Spring
City was $179,407.00. The proposed 1948 budget of the
defendant Spring City, (Defendant's Exhibit 1) a public
hearing upon passage of which was held December 13,
1947, lists expenditures anticipated in the year 1948 in the
aggregate sum of $16,091.08, exclusive of an anticipated
expenditure of $15,000.00 for "an electric plant pipeline"
(line 40, Def. Sp. City's Exhibit 1) the cost of which was
to have been obtained from "revenue on electric pipe
bonds $20,000.00." (line 18, Def. Exhibit 1) Among other
proposed expenditures was a payment of $5,100.00,
termed in defendant's Exhibit 1 as "Ephraim Bank bond
and interest". (Def. Exhibit 1, line 39)
As found by the trial court, the revenues of the city
in the year 1948 equalled $20,284.44.
'"TPursuant to a resolution (State's Exhibit B) of Janu5
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ary 5, 1948, duly passed by the unanimous affirmative
vote of all councilmen, and for the recited consideration
of an "immediate, imperative and pressing need of raising
funds to the amount of $12,000.00 for the purpose of extending and improving the power and light plant to be
owned and controlled by the city" (paragraph, 1, p. 2,
State's Exhibit B), the city issued its bonds designated
City of Spring City Power and Light Bond Series of
January 15, A. D. 1948 in the face amount of $12,000.00
in the following form:
UNITED STATES OF AMEBIC A
STATE OF UTAH
SANPETE COUNTY
CITY OF SPRING CITY
Power and Light Bond
Series of January 15, A. D. 1948
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That the City of Spring City, in Sanpete
County, State of Utah, hereby acknowledges itself
to be indebted and for value received, hereby
promises to pay to the bearer hereof the sum of
ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) in lawful money of the United States of America, on the
15th day of January,
, at the Bank of Ephraim, Ephraim, Utah, with interest thereon at the
rate of three and one-half percent (3%%) per annum from date until paid, payable annually in like
money on the fifteenth day of January in each
year, said interest to maturity being represented
by interest coupons hereto attached.
This bond is one of a series of twelve (12)
6
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bonds of like date and amount, numbered from (1)
to twelve (12) inclusive, for the aggregate sum
of Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) issued
pursuant to the provisions of Section 15-8-6, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, and all other laws thereto
enabling.
It is hereby certified, recited and. declared
that the entire indebtedness of said City hereby
incurred, together with all other indebtedness incurred by said City for and during the year 1948,
is not in excess of the taxes levied or to be levied
for the current year.
It is hereby further certified, recited and de
clared that all conditions, acts, and things essential
to the validity of this bond exist, have happened
and have been done, and that every requirement of
law affecting the issue thereof has been duly complied with, and this bond is within every debt and
other limits prescribed by the Constitution and
laws of -said State and that the full faith and credit
of said Spring City are hereby irrevocably pledged
to the punctual payment of the principal and interest of this bond according to its terms.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said Spring City
has caused this bond to be signed by its Mayor,
its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed, and attested by its City Recorder, and the annexed coupons to bear the facsimile signature of the City
Treasurer, as of the 15th day of January, A. D.,
1948.
(s) Charles A. Thompson
Mayor
ATTEST:
(s) Henry Blaine
City Recorder
(SEAL)

7
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The official capacity and the signatures of the persons signing the resolution and the bonds are not disputed.
None of the bonds were to mature until the year
1961. (Plaintiff's exhibit D-l through D-12, photostatic
copies of the bonds, and Plaintiff's exhibit B, the authorizing resolution). It is manifestly evident from the audit
conducted (Plaintiff's exhibit F) and from the testimony,
that the purpose of protracting amortization and discharge of the debt for the period of some 13 years was
to enable the defendant Spring City to discharge existing
indebtedness. Schedule " 1 " of the audit (Pis. Exhibit F)
discloses that in the year 1961 there will remain oniy
$1,300.00 of general obligations of Spring City, exclusive of the disputed issue. In the testimony of Virgus
Osborne, councilman in January 1948, beginning at line
18, page 91 of the transcript, the purpose of deferring
the debt until 1961, it clearly shows, was in order to enable the City to conveniently meet all payments of princiQuestion: What impression did you have, as to
what kind of bonds you were considering?
Answer: I thought they were revenue bonds.
Question: Why?
Answer:

For one reason that on the $13,000.00
and the $12,000.00 that we borrowed,
was about—and $13,000.00 was paid
off to the Bank of Ephraim, and these
others were not to be paid until these
were all paid up, that is this $12,000.00
8
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issue was not to be paid on, until the
other issue was paid.
Interest was to be paid annually from date of issuance of the bonds until maturity of the bond to which coupons were annexed for interest payments. (Plaintiff's
exhibit C, photostatic copies of the coupons)
On January 27, 1948, the plaintiff, State of Utah, by
its Commission of Finance, purchased the bonds for the
sum of $13,498.67 representing principal, premium and
accrued interest, all such sum being paid from the permanent school fund of the State Land Board. (K. p. 39)
Until January 15, 1950, the defendant, Spring City, paid
all interest payments as they became due and payable.
On January 15, 1951, the state treasurer presented for
payment the coupons of said bonds then payable in the
total amount of $420.00. Payment was refused and no
payment or portion thereof has been made thereon. The
defendant Spring City, and its present mayor and councilmen maintain that the bounds and coupons are void.
They have refused and continue to refuse to make payment upon the interest coupons.
The trial court entered its findings of fact to the
effect that the plaintiff held unpaid bonds issued by
Spring City in the sum of $14,500.00 in addition to the issue of $12,000.00 subject of this litigation. (R. p. 41) The
trial court found that the proceeds of the bond issue now
in dispute were used for corporate purposes to the extent
of $12,000.00 and that $1,398.67 was retained by Lauren
W. Gibbs as his commission for the sale of the bonds pursuant to an agreement between Gibbs and Spring City.
9
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(B. p. 43) The trial court found further that the defendant Spring City did not have on hand any funds for
the payment of the face amount of the bond's in the year
1948, (R. p. 40) but found, rather, from an audit (State's
Exhibit F) conducted by Wood, Child, Mann & Smith,
accountants, that the defendant Spring City incurred a
deficit in the year 1948 in the sum of $2,067.90. (E. p. 40)
The audit from which that finding was made however, has
incorporated "proceeds from bond issues—$24,766.33" in
the receipts column, and "$27,140.78 operation and maintenance—material" in the expenditure column. (Exhibit
C of the audit, State's Exhibit F) It is submitted that the
court erred in finding a $2,067.90 deficit to have been incurred. The audit reflects proceeds of bond issues and
expenditures from bond issue funds, neither of which
have any bearing in a determination of current revenue
and current expenditures as those terms are contemplated by the constitutional limits upon debt.
Based upon the finding that the "expenditures" for
the year 1948 exceeded the "revenues" as the figure representing each appeared in the audit, the court concluded
as a matter of law that Article XIV, Section 3 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah had been violated. Upon the finding that the existing debt of $14,500.00, plus
the debt, subject of this litigation, of $12,000.00, exceeded twelve percent of the valuation of taxable property
in the city's corporate limits, as taken from the last assessment for city purposes, the trial court concluded that
Section 4, Article XIV of the Constitution of the State
of Utah also was violated.
10
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The court further found that the individual defend
ants did not falsely or negligently represent to the plaintiff that all conditions, acts and things essential to the
validity of the bonds existed, had happened, and had been
done, and that if plaintiff did not know the financial condition of Spring City and did not know whether the bonds
issued were within the constitutional debt limits, it should
have known (E. pp. 40 & 41); and that the defendants
were entitled to rely upon the opinion of the Attorney
General of the State of Utah, and the legal advice of the
defendants' bond broker and his attorney as to the validity of the bonds. (E. p. 42) The court found that although
the bonds show upon their face that they purport to be
within the revenues of the year 1948, yet the bond proceedings authorizing the $12,000.00 bond issue do not provide for any tax or any other method for payment thereof. (E. p. 41) The court further found that the State of
Utah was negligent in failing to determine the financial
condition of Spring City in the year 1948. Upon those
findings and conclusion's, the court entered its decree
that the plaintiff, State of Utah, is entitled to recover
nothing on either of its causes of action against either or
any of the defendants and that the Power and Light
Bonds, Series of January 15, A.D. 1948, in the sum of
$12,000.00 are, as are the coupons thereupon, unconstitutional, void and uncollectible.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, ISSUED
BY THE DEFENDANT SPRING CITY, ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID.
1. The debt limit imposed by Article XIV, Section 3,
Constitution of Utah, was not exceeded.
2. The debt limit imposed by Article XIV, Section 4,
was not exceeded.

POINT I I
THE CITY COUNCIL OF DEFENDANT SPRING CITY
WAS AUTHORIZED AND EMPOWERED TO BORROW, UPON
NEGOTIABLE BONDS, FUNDS TO BE USED FOR CORPORATE PURPOSES.

POINT III
IF THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, BE
VOID IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ELECTION AUTHORIZING
THAT ISSUE, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
UPON THE THEORY OF MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.

POINT IV
IF THE BOND ISSUE IS VOID, THE PLAINTIFF MAY
RECOVER AGAINST THE ISSUING AUTHORITIES BECAUSE OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THOSE OFFICIALS IN
AUTHORIZING THE ISSUE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, ISSUED
BY THE DEFENDANT SPRING CITY ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID.
T h e t r i a l court, in it's findings of fact a n d conclusions
of law, d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e b o n d s issued b y S p r i n g City,
series of a n d d a t e d J a n u a r y 15, 1948, w e r e in excess of
t h e d e b t limit i m p o s e d b y A r t i c l e X I V , Sections 3 a n d 4,
12
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of the Constitution of the State of Utah, since no election
at which the proposition to create the debt here disputed
was •submitted to the qualified and taxpaying electors.
1. The debt limit imposed by Article XIV, Section 3,
Constitution of Utah, was not exceeded.
Article XIV, Section 3 of the Constitution, reads
as follows :
No debt in excess of the taxes for the current
year shall be created by any county or subdivision
thereof, or by any school district therein, or by any
cit}^, town or village, or any subdivision thereof
in this State; unless the proposition to create such
debt, shall have been submitted to a vote of such
qualified electors as shall have paid a property tax
therein, in the year preceding such election, and a
majority of those voting thereon •shall have voted
in favor of incurring such debt.
The trial court found that in the year 1948 the expenditures of the defendant Spring City exceeded its
revenues by the sum of $2,067.90 as shown by an audit.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit F)
At this point, we will assert that exception is taken
to that finding, inasmuch a-s the audit has incorporated
into the receipts and expenditures account, items which
have no bearing upon the determination of the constitutional question of what is "current revenue" within the
meaning of that term. The audit has included, on the
"receipts" side of the account from which the court's finding was made, an item denominated "proceeds from bond
issues—$24,766.33;" and on the "expenditures" side of
the same account, there appears "operation and maintenance—material—$27,140.78."
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Both of those items should be excluded from anj
accounting, the purpose of which is to ascertain the
amount of current revenue over current expenditures.
After this revision alone, the audit would then show that
revenues for the year 1948 exceeded the expenditures
by the sum of $306.55. However, for reasons to be discussed hereinafter, we take the position that the overall
relationship of expenditure to revenue is not material
if the obligation disputed is incurred in fact before expenditures and obligations being currently created have
TBSk in the critical year, exceeded the potential revenues
for the entire year. We therefore will not argue at this
time the propriety of the trial court's finding that a deficit, speaking in terms of the questions with which we
are now concerned, in fact occurred.
Upon that finding of a deficit, however, the trial
court proceeded to determine that the municipality of
Spring City had created a debt in excess of its revenue
(including taxes for the year 1948), and that therefore,
all outstanding obligation's incurred in that year, remaining unpaid at the expiration thereof, became and were,
ab initio, unconstitutional and void.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law were
by the court. Included therein was a preamble in which
the trial judge cites the case Fritch vs. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 15 Utah 83, 47 Pac. 1026.
We respectfully submit that the trial court erred in
its application of the Fritch case to the facts here, invalidating the disputed bonds for the reason that Spring
City expended more in 1948 than its revenues equaled
14
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in that year. This holding becomes particularly objectionable when it appears that the claim of the State of Utah,
purchasers of the disputed bonds, became fixed and
definite upon January 15th, 1948. We submit that on
January 15th, the 1948 debt limit of Spring City could not
have been exceeded, even after applying to the sum of
expenditures made and obligations incurred as a charge
against 1948 revenue's up to January 15, the further sum
of $13,498.67, the amount paid by plaintiff for the bonds
we now consider. The total revenue of the City for the
year 1948 was the sum of $20,284.44. (K. p. 40) The word
"taxes" in the constitutional provision above cited has
been construed to mean "all potential revenues for the
current year, from whatever source obtainable." Muir vs.
Murray City, 55 Utah 368,186 Pac. 433.
Moreover, we submit that by express recitation in the
proceedings preliminary to the issuance of these bonds,
(Plaintiff's Exhibit B, [resolution authorizing bonds] p.
2) there was an "immediate, imperative and pressing
need of raising funds to the amount of $12,000.00 for the
purpose of extending and improving the power and light
plant to be owned and controlled by the city in order to
better serve the inhabitants," and that the further recitation that "the sum of $12,000.00 may be raised at this
time without incurring any indebtedness or liability
by said city in excess of the revenue of the said city for
the current year, 1948," contained in the resolution passed
by the Spring City council January 5, 1948, (State's Exhibit B) was a statement to the effect that the procurement of $12,000.00 was immediate, imperative and press15
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ing to the extent of being a required expenditure in the
year 1948. We contend further that the recital therein,
to the effect that in procuring that amount, the City would
not exceed the revenues of the City for the current year,
1948, was an implied, if not an express covenant on the
part of the city council to forebear from a diversion of
funds which might become available for the payment of
these bonds. It would clearly appear that it became incumbent upon the city council after entering into that
covenant, that they would not do any acts, allow any appropriations, or make any disbursements subsequent to
the execution of that covenant which would destroy, alter
or abridge their power and authority to create that debt.
A purchaser of municipal bonds is entitled to rely upon
a covenant of that tenor and import, and innocent holders
may not be trapped by a subsequent diversion of funds
in breach of that covenant.
It appears from the audit, (State's Exhibit P) that in
the year 1948 there was paid to an obligee unnamed therein, the sum of $5,000.00 for a "tax anticipation note". It is
conceivable, though not in evidence, that that disbursement might have been unauthorized, and ultra vires for
the reason that the obligation might itself have been void,
as having been incurred in the year 1947 (or prior years)
after the city had exceeded its debt limit by having expended in excess of its revenues for that year. If that
expenditure was not a valid obligation, it could not have
taken precedence over the obligation incurred by the issuance of the instant bonds.
We take further exception to the trial court's appli16
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cation of the Fritch case to the facts here, particularly ii
light of a case decided immediately after the Fritch case,
Pleasant Valley Coal Company vs. County Commissioners, Salt Lake County, 15 Utah 97, 48 Pac. 1032. In
that case the question was upon the liability of the county
to pay to the plaintiff the price agreed for coal delivered
in the month of December, 1896. In 1897 a claim therefor
was presented by the plaintiff. Contention of the county
commissioners was that at the time of the furnishing of
the coal the county had already exceeded its limit of indebtedness. The court said:
The material question to be determined is
whether at the time of the furnishing of the coal,
Salt Lake County had already exceeded the limit
of its indebtedness which it was allowed to create
by law.
Although the question in that case involved the effect of
the Constitution of Utah becoming operative during a
fiscal period in which the debt limit of the county was
disputed, the ratio decidendi of that case is still to the
effect that the validity of an obligation is determined not
as of the end of the year but as of the time when the liability is incurred. The court there said:
To refuse to acknowledge and pay a just debt
is a thing to be discouraged and should not be
aided by judicial construction. Such thinking dispels confidence, ruins credit and casts a reproach
upon government. # * * Counsel for the appellant
insists that some of the questions raised in this
record was decided in the case of Fritch vs. Board
15 Utah 83 [hereinabove cited] and, it appears,
adversely to the views herein expressed * * * that
17
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case, while it affected the same warrants was imperfectly before the court and therefore cannot
be regarded as conclusive in this and insofar as it
conflicts herewith is hereby overruled.
It is respectfully submitted that, although not affirmatively stated in the decision of the Pleasant Valley Coal
Co. case, one of the views of the Fritch case to be overruled was the disregard in the Fritch case of the question
as to the financial condition of the county at the time the
liability was incurred.
It is therefore respectfully submitted to this court
that at the time these bonds were issued, January 15,
1948, the city of Spring City had not exceeded its constitutional debt limit; nor had it expended, disbursed, appropriated or pledged funds in excess of its revenues
for the year 1948, even after it had incurred an obligation
to pay to the State of Utah the sum of $13,398.67. Spring
City impliedly covenanted not to thereafter permit the diversion of funds so as to invalidate this obligation, by reciting that they were within their debt limit. Their subsequent acts of disbursement and acts of creating debt,
not those authorizing this disputed debt, were ultra vires,
unconstitutional and void.
We submit that if, as of the date this obligation became fixed, the debt was not in excess of the constitutional limit, then there is no objection to making the date
for payment of those bonds a time in the future when the
city could do so conveniently from the revenues from
the system and from general taxes and after other existing general obligations and encumbrances upon utilities
18
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of the city had been paid and satisfied.
Appellant further excepts to the application of the
Fritch case to the facts here, particularly in respect to
the court's interpretation of that case as holding that
No debt which cannot be paid from the revenues of the current year shall be created without
a bond election and that bonds issued by the city
against the current revenues of the year and
without a bond election are payable solely out of
such current revenues and are unenforceable
against the revenue's of any other year. (Taken
from trial court's preamble to findings, R. p. 35)
In Muir vs. Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 Pac. 433, "tWs
court said:
This section of the constitution [Article XIV,
Section 3] undoubtedly prohibits a municipality
from creating an indebtedness in excess of the
revenue for the current year unless the proposition is submitted to a vote of the qualified electors
and approved by the majority thereof; but the
inhibition goes only to the question of excess
amount and not to the time of payment. / / the
amount of indebtedness is limited to the revenue
of the current year, we know of no constitutional
objection to providing for payment after the year
expires. (Italics added)
In that case Murray City borrowed from the plaintiff
the sum of $1200.00 payable in four annual instalments
evidenced by four promissory notes, one payable in one
year, one payable in two years, one in three years, and
the last in four years. The defendant City had paid two
of these notes as the same came due but thereafter repudiated the remainder of the debt, and when sued there19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on the defendant City counterclaimed for return of the
payments made on the first two notes on the theory that
the City by incurring such obligation and making it payable in years subsequent to that in which the debt was in- *
curred had violated Article XIV, Section 3 of the Constitution in that no election had been held. No evidence
was submitted on the question whether the $1,200 debt
exceeded the anticipated or realized revenue of the year
in which the debt was incurred. The court assumed, in
the absence of proof, that the debt was within the anticipated revenue of the year, and held that the plaintiff
should recover judgment against the City. We quote
from the opinion of the court on page 372 of the Utah
Keports:
* * * If the amount of the indebtedness is
limited to the revenue of the current year, we know
of no constitutional objection to providing for
payment after the year expires. * * *
Although it is not clear from the opinion whether
the later notes evidencing the debt were to be paid from
income for years subsequent to that in which the debt was
incurred, an examination of the abstract of the record
and briefs of counsel before the Utah Supreme Court indicate that in fact such was the case.
In the case of Dickinson vs. Salt Lake City, et al,
57 Utah 530, 195 P. 1110, the court again announced and
followed this rule, "Any failure on the part of the city
authorities to levy a tax necessary to repay such indebtedness could not defeat the indebtedness or render it
any less a legal and binding obligation against the city
20
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(cases cited)." In the case of Scott, County Auditor vs.
Salt Lake County, et al, 58 Utah 25,196 P. 1022, the court
once again cited and followed the Muir case. See page 28
of the Utah Beports. It may thus be seen that the Utah
Supreme Court has already ruled upon this question
and has decided that the constitutional expression "no
debt in excess of the taxes for the current year shall
be created" without an election is an inhibition which runs
only to the incurring of the debt and not to the time of
payment thereof. Inasmuch as the $12,000 debt created by
Spring City January 15, 1948, was well within the revenues for the year 1948, anticipated at that time, and was
slightly more than half the revenues actually realized
for the year 1948, we submit that the provision for repayment for such debt in later years, and the failure to
provide a tax for retirement thereof, does not render
the debt void.
If then, the constitutional prohibition does not extend to the time of payment, it is immaterial that general
obligations issued and created by a municipality include
a provision for payment in a year subsequent to the
year in which they are incurred.
In 41 A.L.R. Page 810, the general rule respecting
payment by municipalities for permanent improvements
is stated thusly:
Most courts hold that a [constitutional] provision against a municipality exceeding in any year
its current revenue does not prevent it from paying for the construction of a permanent improvement out of the revenue of a year subsequent to
that in which it was erected if a contract on which
21
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the claim is based was valid when it was made.
The fact that for some reason the amount called
for was not paid in the year in which the liability
was incurred does not affect the right to recover
it if the claim was originally a valid one. (Italics
added)
Thus, in Wilson vs. Gaston (1914) 141 Ga. 770, 82
S. E. 136, wherein it appeared that a valid contract had
been made and performed in 1912, but that the warrant
issued to pay for the work done was not honored in that
year, the court said:
When the warrant fell due, all moneys in the
treasury provided for its payment had been applied to other purposes, on account of unusual expenses which the treasurer had paid indiscriminately, without any participation or consent upon
the part of the Gallion Iron Works Company; and
the warrant was not paid. It was not contended
that the commissioner was unauthorized to buy
piping for constructing culverts in the public
roads, but only that he was unauthorized to create
a debt therefor within the meaning of the Constitution. The validity of the contract was not destroyed by reason of the diversion of the funds provided
for its payment, under the circumstances above
enumerated; but, notwithstanding such diversion,
the obligation of the county to pay continued to
exist.
. . . After default in payment of the warrant the
county was in the condition of having a valid,
overdue obligation, and without funds to meet it.
What was the duty of the county under these circumstances? The law provides that a tax may be
levied to pay the legal indebtedness of a county
due, or to become due during the year, or past due.
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Civ. Code, Section 513 (1). 'When debts have accumulated against the county, so that 100 percent
on the state tax, or the annual amount specially
allowed by local law, cannot pay the current expenses of the county and the debt in one year, they
'shall pay off as rapidly as possible, at least 25
per cent every year.' Civ. Code, Section 50?. The
contention of the plaintiff, as presented by the
pleadings and evidence, was that the debt could not
be paid at all out of the taxes raised in 1913 [the
year after the contract was executed]. It was
neither contended nor made to appear that the
debts against the county were so large that this
liability could not be paid in 1913. Under the foregoing circumstances it appears that there was a
legal liability against the county, no funds with
which to meet it, but power in the commissioner
to provide for its payment by levy of a tax in
1913. The county authorities should levy a sufficient tax and pay the debt.
I t appears throughout the record, transcript and
exhibits that the bonds here disputed were not to begin
maturing until the year 1961. (State's Exhibits D-l
through D-12, photostatic copies of the bonds, R. p. 33)
This provision for payment at a date some 13 years in
the future was for the purpose of allowing the city to
amortize existing indebtedness and allow for the payment
of these bonds after current bonded debt had been discharged. (Tr. p. 91) In the official audit (State's Exhibit F ) there appears "Schedule Number 1" a statement
of the bonded indebtedness of Spring City as of December
31,194$ As appears from that schedule, in the year 1961
there will remain total bonded debt, upon general obligations of the city, only $1,300.00, in addition to the in-
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debtedness disputed in this litigation. Section 10-8-87,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides that a city may
levy "not to exceed 3.5 mills to construct and maintain
gas works, electric light works, telephone lines, state railways and bath houses." Section 10-7-9 provides that a
city council may levy a tax sufficient to pay interest and
to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of principal
upon bonds issued for the purpose of supplying the city
with, inter alia, "artificial lights * * * as shall be owned
and controlled by the municipality." Section 10-7-9 further provides that:
m
Whenever bonds shall have been issued for the
purpose of supplying any city or town with artificial light, water or other public utility, the rates
of charges for the service of the system or plant
so constructed may be made sufficient to meet such
payment's in addition to operating and maintenance expenses and taxes shall be levied to meet any
deficiencies.
It is respectfully submitted that in the year 1961,
Spring City shall have had ample opportunity to amortize
existing indebtedness to the extent of being fully capable
of paying, conveniently, and without hardship or excess
taxation, the bonds in dispute here.
Clearly the Wilson case, supra, could be given application here, particularly where the proceeds of the bond
issue now disputed have implemented the revenue raising power, and decreased the necessity for maintenance
of old facilities of the power and light system, benefited
by the sale of the instant bonds.
In Lawrence County vs. Lawrence Fiscal Court, 130
24
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Ky. 587, 113 S.W. 824, the court upheld an order of the
county authorities that a claim during previous years
should be paid, saying:
Even if it should be conceded that the claims
alluded to in the order of the October term of 1906
of the fiscal court, which is the subject of this suit,,
were those allowed in 1903 or 1904, it would not
follow that the order is void. It is not charged,
nor is it pretended, that the claims allowed in
1903 or 1904 were in excess of the income or revenues provided for either of those years. It is not
necessary to the validity of a municipal indebtedness that the municipality shall have made provision for its payment. The inhibition is against
creating an indebtedness in any year that the
municipality is unable to pay out its resources for
that year. If the liabilities incurred, say in 1903,
did not exceed the income and revenues provided
by law,—that is, the maximum which under the
law the county was authorized to levy in taxes,—
plus any available funds it had on hand, then
nothing subsequently occurring could render the
liability void as being in contravention of Section
157, supra. If the county had collected the taxes
levied for the purpose of paying its liabilities
incurred in 1903, but had in some way lost the
money before it paid its debts, that fact could not
affect its liabilities. It would remain bound until
payment, or otherwise legally discharged. See to
the same effect Camden Clay Co. vs. New Martinsville (1910) 67 W. Va. 525, 68 S. E. 118. '
The case there cites with approval Scott vs. Salt Lake
County, supra 58 Utah 25,196 Pac. 1022.
We submit that if the trial court's decision to the
25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

effect that (1) debt may not be protracted to a year other
than the one in which incurred, and (2) that subsequent
diversions of funds in the year in which the debt is created, even if the subsequent diversions are for necessary
corporate^ purposes, operate to destroy, abridge, and
avoid the debt created, then the well known form of commercial obligation, the "tax anticipation" bond or note
is placed in serious jeopardy.
That ruling would unseat and disturb numerous
transactions currently subsisting as valid and enforceable
obligations. Obligations created in anticipation of taxes
have become accepted as a form of obtaining short term
credit for taxing subdivisions, used by practically ever}7
governmental unit having the power to borrow. They are,
by definition, a means of temporary financing in anticipation of current taxes, and from the proceeds of which
the funds derived are to be used for the purposes for
which the taxes are levied and assessed . 43 Am. Jur,
Public Securities and Obligations, Sec. 11, 13. If they
are payable out of taxes to be levied and collected, they
are "general obligations" of the taxing unit. 43 Am. Jur.
pp. 493 to 495. If they are general obligations, they are
a debt within the meaning of the constitutional provisions.
Fjeldsted vs. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P. 2d 144. "Obligations created in anticipation of taxes" necessarily
implies that the taxes are not yet collected—possibly not
levied and assessed. Clearly the intent in creating that
debt is for the purpose of obtaining operating revenue
after current revenues have been found insufficient—
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payment of which debt is to be made in a year subsequent to that in which incurred.
If the taxing unit could so avoid debt and liability,
either of the city, or as individual officers of the city,
they could channel the taxes when collected into other
funds, budgets, or forms of expenditure or debt, to leave
no tolerance of current revenue over current expenditures, and then, by a ruling such as has been made in the
trial court, avoid the consequences of the obligation incurred previously. Thereafter, it would not be required
of the various municipalities, school districts, or counties,
to pay such debts, but rather it would be required of them
not to pay those debts. The payment would be the satisfaction of an unconstitutional obligation, therefore a gift,
ultra vires, and void.
Appellant is apprehensive that a rule other than
the one urged would do violence to existing contracts and
obligations, disrupt the accepted practices of commercial
financing adopted by custom and long usage, and corrupt
the credit of, and the security market for, government
and its subdivisions.
We respectfully submit that, the debt being valid
when created, and there being no objection to protracting
the time for payment if valid when created, Section 3 of
Article XIV of the Constitution has not been violated.
2. The debt limit imposed by Article XIV, Section 4,
was not exceeded.
The trial court found that at the time plaintiff purchased the disputed bonds the defendant had outstanding
general obligations in the sum of $14,500.00. Those obli27
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gations were evidenced by unpaid bonds issued by Spring
City and held by the plaintiff, the State of Utah. I t found
that the additional issue of $12,000.00 constituted a debt
which was in excess of the debt limit which Spring City
could incur with bond elections. (K. p. 41) The court concluded from that finding that the maximum debt limit of
Section 4, Article X I V of the Utah Constitution had been
exceeded. That section reads as follows:
When authorized to create indebtedness as
provided in Section 3 of this Article, no county
shall become indebted to an amount, including existing indebtedness exceeding two per centum.
No city, town, -school district or other municipal
corporation, shall become indebted to an amount,
including existing indebtedness, exceeding four
per centum of the value of the taxable property
therein, the value to be ascertain by the last assessment for State and County purposes, previous
to the incurring of such indebtedness; except that
in incorporated cities the assessment shall be taken
from the last assessment for city purposes; provided, that no part of the indebtedness allowed in
this section shall be incurred for other than strictly county, city, town or school district purposes;
provided further, that any city of the first and
second class when authorized as provided in Section three of this article, may be allowed to incur
a larger indebtedness, not to exceed four per
centum and any city of the third class, or town,
not to exceed eight per centum additional, for
supplying such city or town with water, artificial
lights or sewers, when the works for supplying
such water, light and sewers, shall be owned and
controlled by the municipality. (As amended November 8, 1910)
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The trial court in its findings at page 41 of the Record, stated:
* * # That at the time plaintiff purchased said
bonds the plaintiff held unpaid bonds issued by
Spring City in the sum of $14,500.00. That the
additional issue of $12,000.00 purchased by plaintiff constituted a debt, held by plaintiff, which was
in excess of the debt limit which Spring City could
incur with bond elections, all of which it knew or
should have known.
The trial court clearly applied the old formula in
computing the maximum debt limit of the City of Spring
City, which formula qualified the word "value" in the
constitutional provision by the word "assessed." Under
that method of computation, the old formula would limit
their power to obligate the city to the sum of $21,528.84,
including existing indebtedness.
In the case of Board of Education, Rich County
School District vs. Passey, 246 Pac. 2d 1078,
Utah
,
this court said:
The language of Article XIV, Section 4 is
clear and unambiguous. It establishes as a debt
limitation four per centum of the value of the taxable property in the district. The word "value"
is not limited or qualified by any adjectives. It
does not read "assessed value" or specify any
other particular kind of value. The word "value"
standing by itself can have only one meaning, viz,
the full worth or actual value—not a fractional
share thereof.
The constitutional provision above cited (Art. XIV, Section 4) provides that a city may incur an original aggre29
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

gate indebtedness of four per cent, and an additional
eight per cent, "for supplying such city or town with
water, artificial light's or sewers," of the value of the
taxable property within the corporate limits of the municipality. In supplying the city with artificial lights the
defendant Spring City qualified to obligate the city to
the extent of twelve per cent of the value of the taxable
property therein, section 4 providing that they may so do
"when authorized as provided in Section 3 of this Article." The qualification of the city under Section 3 has
been discussed hereinabove in subheading 1.
If the County Assessor's assessment figure for the
year 1947 is used as a basis for computing the debt limit
of Spring City, the city could indebt themselves to an
amount equal to twelve percent of a figure, forty percent
of which is $179,407.00, thus making their maximum debt
limit under Article XIV, Section 4, the sum of $53,822.10.
Attention of the court is invited to Section 59-5-1,
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended by Chapter 102,
Laws of Utah, 1947, which provides:
All taxable property must be assessed at forty
percent of its reasonable fair cash value. * * *
It is submitted that this 1947 amendment was merely a
legislative recognition of a pre-existing condition, of
which, it is submitted, courts may take judicial knowledge.
78-25-1 (3) Utah Code Annotated 1953; State Board of
Land Comrs. vs. Ririe, 56 Utah 213, 190 Pac. 59. It is
respectfully requested that this court take judicial knowledge of the following records of the Utah State Tax
Commission, an executive department of this state.
30
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

From those records, the overall state property tax
assessments- in the State of Utah were as they appear
opposite the respective year in which the assessment was
made:
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949

$671,281,023.00
$655,895,447.00
$681,586,560.00
$765,371,793.00
$823,749,300.00

It will be noted from those figures that the practice of
assessing property at forty percent of its actual value
was the customary, common, and accepted practice in
the State of Utah prior to 1947 inasmuch as there is no
substantial increase reflected in the assessment for the
year 1947, nor for subsequent years. It is clear then, that
the 1947 assessment roll showed that the fair cash value
of the property within the corporate limits of Spring
City was an amount, forty percent of which equalled
$179,407.00. The actual value of the taxable property in
Spring City, $448,517.50, would permit an aggregate debt
of $53,822.10, (12% of the value) and some $27,322.10 in
excess of the then existing indebtedness of Spring City in
the amount of $14,500.00, together with the debt now disputed in the sum of $12,000.00, and there clearly was no
violation of the provisions imposing maximum debt contained in Article XIV, Section 4.
POINT II
THE CITY COUNCIL OF DEFENDANT SPRING CITY
WAS AUTHORIZED AND EMPOWERED TO BORROW, UPON
NEGOTIABLE BONDS, FUNDS TO BE USED FOR CORPORATE PURPOSES.

Among the powers and duties of all cities enumerated
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in Chapter 8, Title 10, there appears the following:
10-8-2:
They [city councils of cities] may appropriate
money for corporate purposes only and provide
for payment of debts and expenses of the corporation * * * May purchase, receive, hold property,
real and personal for the benefit of the city * * *
improve and protect such property * * * provided
that it shall be deemed a corporate purpose to
appropriate money for any purpose which * * *
will provide for the safety, preserve the health,
promote the prosperity and improve the morals,
peace, order, comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the city.
Section 10-8-6 provides:
They may borrow money on the credit of the
corporation for corporte purposes in the manner
and to the extent allowed by the constitution and
the laws and issue warrants and bonds therefor
in such amounts and forms and on such conditions
as they shall determine.
Section 10-8-14 provides:
They may construct, maintain and operate
'* * * electric light works * * *.
Vol. 43 Am. Jur., Public Securities and Obligation's, Section 39, states:
There are cases undoubtedly in which it is
proper and desirable that a limited power to issue
long term, interest bearing negotiable bonds
should be conferred on a political subdivision, as
where some extensive public work is to be performed the expense of which is beyond the immediate resource of reasonable taxation and capable of
being fairly and justly spread over an extended
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period of time. # * # Where the power is clearly
given and securities have been issued in conformity therewith, they will stand on the same basis
and be entitled to the same privileges as public
securities and commercial paper generally.
Section 40 following says:
# # # rp|ie g e n e r a j power to issue bond's must
be taken to authorize bonds in the usual form of
such well known, commercial obligations.
It is clear from the express wording of the statute and
the commentaries upon similar statute's that the city
council of Spring City had authority to issue bonds and
in accordance with customary and usual form they may
be long term bonds. There being no constitutional objection to a city creating debt payable in a subsequent
year as has been hereinabove considered, there is an express statutory authority for the issuance of bonds of
that character.
POINT III
IF THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, BE
VOID IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ELECTION AUTHORIZING
THAT ISSUE, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
UPON THE THEORY OF "MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.

In 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, Fifth Edition,
page 1547, Section 961, is announced the rule allowing
recovery by a bondholder on the theory of money had and
received by the issuer from the purchaser when, for some
reason, the bonds issued by a municipal corporation are
void. We quote therefrom:
If a municipal corporation sells and disposes
of negotiable instruments purporting to be bonds,
33
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the transaction is a loan to the municipality. The
municipality is in the market as a borrower and
receives the money in that character, notwithstanding the transaction assumes the form of a
sale of its •securities. If it has power to borrow
money or to incur debt for the purposes for which
the bonds are issued, and the ground of invalidity
urged against the bonds is that the city had no
power to issue bond's which are negotiable in form,
or that it had not authority to make bonds payable
in the form and manner adopted, the transaction
resulting in the transfer of the consideration for
the issue justifies a recovery against the municipality as for money of the plaintiff had and received by it. The principal upon which a recovery
has been sustained under such circumstances rs the
broad obligation to do justice which rests upon all
persons, natural and artificial; in con-sequence of
which it has been declared that if a municipality
obtains the money or property of others without
authority, the law, independently of any statute,
will compel restitution or compensation. The action is justified under the forms of the common
law on the ground that it rs an action for money
of the plaintiff had and received by the municipality, being money paid by mistake or upon a consideration which happens to fail, or money got
through imposition. But if the municipality has
not received any consideration for the issue of the
bonds, the foundation for an action to recover a
debt owing by the municipality does not exist,
and an action by the purchaser or holder of the
bonds against the municipality will not lie. The
right to recover against the municipality as for
money had and received also implies capacity on
the part of the city to contract debt or to borrow
money.
.
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The record shows without dispute that the defendant
Spring City received from the State of Utah for the bonds
in question the sum of $13,498.67. The record further
shows that the money thus received was applied by the
city to purposes for which Spring City may validly appropriate and for which it may properly incur debts.
Moreover there is no question in this case as to whether
all parties were acting in good faith under a belief that
the bonds were valid and proper. If the bonds sued upon
be void as violative of the Utah Construction, Article
XIV, Section 3, then it cannot be said but that these
bonds were issued and purchased upon a mistake made
by all parties, honestly and in good faith. We believe
that upon these facts the plaintiff is entitled to restitution of the money paid apart from the express contract
on the theory of money had and received, and that the
better reasoned authorities will support this view.
The case of Commercial Trust Company of Hagerstown vs. Laurens County, 267 Fed. 901 (D.C., S.D. Georgia W.D. 1920), is in point. The constitution of Greorgia
provided, "No such county, municipality, or division shall
incur any new debt, except for a temporary loan or loans
to supply casual deficiencies of revenue, not to exceed
one-fifth of one per centum of the assessed value of taxable property therein, without the assent of two-thirds of
the qualified voters thereof, at an election for that purpose to be held as prescribed by law." The defendant
County had incurred a debt totaling $75,000.00 by resolution, on the theory that it was made to meet a "casual
and temporary deficiency of revenue." One-fifth of one
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per cent of the assessed valuation of the defendant
County amounted to $18,720.00. The court, therefore,
held that the notes evidencing the debt were void. The
Federal District Court of Georgia held that the holders of
these notes could recover upon the theory of money had
and received. We quote from the opinion:
While, as we have seen, the county could not
lawfully borrow money to meet these warrants,
but must wait for the coming in of the taxes laid
therefor, the loan is void only for the defect of
power, and is not an act punished by any law.
The maxim in pari delicto does not apply. While
the money does not by its mere reception become
public money, for the treasurer's sureties are not
even liable for it on his bond (case's cited) nor is
the treasurer entitled to commissions for handling
it (cases cited) yet when actually applied by the
county officers to its lawful use the county becomes liable for it, not on any express or inferred
contract, but ex aequo et bono to the extent only
that it is so used (cases cited). This remedy seems
appropriate, where the lender's money is directly
used by the county through its proper officer^ in
the extinguishment of lawful claims against the
county, or in purchases it then might lawfully
make.
The district court of the southern district of Florida
in the case of Olds vs. Town of Bellair, 41 F . Supp. 453,
(1941) held similarly. The statute creating the defendant
City gave to that city the power to issue and sell its bonds
for constructing municipal improvements "Provided,
such issue and sale of bonds shall be ratified by a majority of the qualified electors of said town who are tax-
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payers and who paid taxes on their own property in the
town of Bellair Heights, assessed and levied for the calendar year prior to that in which said election is held
and actually voting in an election to be held for that purpose." The city officials held a bond election before the
time in which that statute could become operative and issued its bonds based upon that election. The court in
an action subsequently brought to recover on those bonds
held that the bonds were void because the law requiring
an election was not followed. However, it permitted the
bondholder to recover the actual consideration paid for
the bonds (in this case they were purchased at a discount)
on the theory of money had and received because the record's showed that the money had been paid by the plaintiff, received by the city and expended for purposes within the powers of the city, all in good faith.
In the case of Bank of Cameron vs. Aleppo Township, 13 Atl. 2d 40, 338 Penn. 300, (1940), the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania had before it a similar question.
The constitution of Pennsylvania required that when a
debt is incurred, an annual tax must be provided sufficient to pay the interest and principal of the debt within
thirty years. A statute required that the township file
for public record its financial statement prior to incurring
debts. These provisions were not complied with when the
defendant township issued certain negotiable promissory
note's for the purpose of highway improvement. In an action brought to recover the amount of the loan the court,
in allowing recovery, stated:
There can be no question that in Pennsyl-
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vania, where a municipality issues an express con
tract or formal obligation which is void because of
the failure of its authorities to comply with the
constitutional and statutory requirement's here involved, an action for money had and received by
the lender of the money will lie. There is an implied obligation resting upon the municipality
to pay back what was lent to it in good faith; Ohlinger v. Maidencreek Township, 312 Pa. 289, 167
A. 882, 90 A.L.K. 1227.
The court further announced the same rule in McGregor's Estate vs. Young Township, 38 Atl. 2d 313, 350
Penn. 93, (1949). We quote headnote 6 to that case from
the Atlantic Keporter:
Where municipality, such as township, borrowing money, issues express contract or formal
obligation, which is void because of its authorities'
failure to comply with constitutional and statutory
requirements that provision be made for annual
tax sufficient to pay interest on and principal of
indebtedness within 30 years and that financial
statement be filed, action by lender for money had
and received lies, as implied obligation rests on
municipality to pay back amount lent to it in good
faith for lawful purpose.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina in the case of
Craig, et al vs. Bell, et al, 46 SE 2d 52 (1948), decided a
•similar question. In that case the trustees of a school
district had> on the assumption that certain statutes gave
them the authority, incurred a debt for the purpose of
constructing a building, and had given therefor its promissory note. The court held that the trustees had no such
authority but that the holder of the note could recover on
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the theory of money had and received. We quote headnote
9 to that case from the Southeastern Reporter:
Where trustees of school district erroneously
but in good faith and on advice of school authorities, believed that certain statutes gave them authority to borrow money, and debt of school district to lender was incurred in utmost good faith,
•school district was legally obligated under the
principle of money had and received, and trustees
could then legally deliver a new note and substitute it for the invalid note which the lender held.
In the case of Octonoco County vs. The Town of
Townsend, 246 NW 410 (Wise. 1933), the Wisconsin Supreme Court had before it the question whether, when an
over-all levy limit is placed on a political subdivision^
this limit includes a levy for debt payment. Though this
question is not exactly in point here, we quote the language of the Wisconsin court to show its attitude toward
municipal debt however it may be incurred :
The whole trend and history of the decisions
of this court are as favorable to the collection of
municipal indebtedness as any system can well be.
It is thoroughly established in this state that a
municipality that has received and used the moneys of creditors cannot escape the repayment of
such moneys because of any invalidity in the bonds
issued for the payment thereof.
Under these decisions the municipality is liable to any creditors for money had and received
and anyone who has loaned money to the municipality which has been received and used by the
municipality for municipal purposes, may recover
of the municipality, and the amount of the judg39
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ment so recovered must be placed upon the next
tax roll and collected with other moneys.
There are cases denying recovery on the theory advanced here. The better reasoned of these cases denying
recovery are on facts not before this court; that is, recovery is uniformly denied where the money received for
the evidences of indebtedness is not used for public purposes or for purposes within the power of the municipality in the first instance. Other cases deny recovery where
the debt limit rs exceeded, at least to the extent of such
excess on the grounds that there is an entire want of
power in a city to exceed debt limits, regardless of how
the money is spent.
This court has had occasion to rule upon the question
of restoration to the aggrieved party of the consideration
with which he parted on an invalid contract. In Moe vs.
Millard County School District, 54 Utah 144, 179 P. 980,
this court allowed fixtures, purchased upon a void contract by the School District, to be removed from the premises, although stating that they believed them to have
become annexed to the realty. The court said:
It might be conceded that most, if not all, of
the property sought to be removed by this action
would be classed as fixtures in a contest between
parties where the application of the rules of law
governing fixtures was admitted, such as between
landlord and tenant, mortgagor and mortgagee,
etc. * * * (citing cases) But we cannot see how
the doctrine of fixtures becomes applicable to this
case so as to prevent a recovery of the property
here sought,
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then again at page 151, of 54 Utah:
* * # When it is conceded that the plaintitr
has no other remedy, [to prevent removal] would
clearly be a subversion of the purpose for which
the constitutional and statutory provisions in
question were framed, and would permit the taxpayers of the defendant •school district improperly
because unnecessarily, to shift the burden of the
education of the children in the district to the
shoulders of those who in good faith have furnished the material for the completion of the
school building, to the extent of the value of this
property, which we think they would not desire,
nor should they be permitted to do.
In -so ruling, the court saw fit to abrogate, when
circumstances such as in this case were present, a settled
rule of law pertaining to the distinction between real and
personal property for the movability thereof.
In the Muir case above cited, the briefs of the prevailing party relief heavily upon the theories of unjust
enrichment and money had and received. We cite Muir
vs. Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 P. 433, first, for the
proposition that the obligations themselves were in that
case validated. We believe the opinion to be clear and unambiguous in holding that the constitutional prohibition
goes to the amount, and not to the time of payment.
But we cite the case secondly, alternatively, for the
theory upon which a portion of the case was argued, and
possibly decided—that of quantum merit, unjust enrichment, and money had and received. A reference to the
points upon which the prevailing party in his brief relied
will indicate as much. The first point was "Municipal
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Power and Duty to be Honest." The second point was
"Estoppel," urging:
A municipality cannot acquire property
under an invalid contract and plead the invalidity
as a defeirse, and also retain the property.

;

And in the conclusion:
From the authorities cited, it is seen that
courts grant relief in cases like this, upon the
ground of money had and received, estoppel or
ratification, but more often upon the principle of
justice, scjuare dealing and equity.

(All citations to briefs in Muir vs. Murray City,
supra, taken from volume 277, Abstracts and Briefs
[cases No. 3356-3374], Utah State Library).
We respectfully submit that the facts before this
court warrant recovery by the plaintiff against Spring
City in any event for the money paid to Spring City
for its bonds issued January 15, 1948. The city received
the money from the state, all parties acting in good
faith. Moreover the city had the power to incur such
debt, and the authority to expend moneys for the purposes the money so received was expended. Justice,
equity and good conscience are in favor of the plaintiff,
and Spring City should not in good conscience be
allowed to keep the money so received and the benefits
therefrom derived and at the same time escape liability
on the debt thus created because an election was not
held.
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POINT IV
IF THE BOND ISSUE IS VOID, THE PLAINTIFF MAY
RECOVER AGAINST THE ISSUING AUTHORITIES BECAUSE OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THOSE OFFICIALS IN
AUTHORIZING THE ISSUE.

The bonds in issue recite:
It is hereby further certified, recited and
declared that all conditions, acts, and things
essential to the validity of this bond exist, have
happened and have been done, and that every
requirement of law affecting the issue thereof has
been duly complied with, and that this bond is
within every debt and other limits prescribed by
the Constitution and laws of said State and that
the full faith and credit of said Spring City are
hereby irrevocably pledged to the punctual payment of the principal and interest of this bond
according to its terms.
This representation is also contained in the minutes
of the action taken by Spring City authorizing this issue,
and these minutes show that all the then city officials
voted for such issue. By this very act and by offering
these bonds to purchasers, these officials were representing that all necessary steps had been taken to constitute
these bonds valid and binding general obligation's of
Spring City. That is, these city officials were representing to any and all prospective purchasers that the bonds
were issued only after "every requirement of law affecting the issue thereof was properly complied with and
that these bonds were "within every debt and other
limits prescribed by the Constitution and laws of" the
State of Utah.
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Furthermore, the record shows (Plaintiff's Exhibh
A), that a financial statement in the form of an affidavit
was executed January 8, 1948, -signed by the defendant
Henry Blain, as City Recorder, and bearing the seal of
Spring City, which affidavit recites that the assessed
valuation of Spring City for the year 1947, as equalized,
was $179,407.00. This affidavit further recited that the
outstanding general obligation bonded indebtedness of
Spring City was at that time $9,500.00, and that the
anticipated revenue for Spring City for 1948 was in
excess of $15,434.92.
The plaintiff as a prospective bond purchaser relied
upon these representations and we believe that plaintiff
was entitled to rely thereon. If^ these facts and conclusions set forth in the representations were not true,
then the plaintiff bondholder may possibly, on legal
principles, be denied recovery as against the Spring City
corporation. However, it is our position that, if these
representations were not true, there was a duty upon
the then mayor, councilmen and recorder to ascertain,
before authorizing the bond issue and selling it, that
they were not true. That is, we believe that a city council
when creating a debt of the city has a duty, not only to
the city, but to prospective bond purchasers to represent the facts of the financial condition of the city and
of the steps taken preparatory to the selling of its bonds,
and this duty is not to act negligently. In this case, J £
the facts are not as represented, these city officials
acted negligently in their duty toward plaintiff as a
prospective bond purchaser, and the plaintiff, therefore,
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should recover for the damages caused by such negligent representations.
In the case of First National Bank of Key West vs.
Filer et al. (Fla, 1933), 145 So. 204, 87 A.L.E. 267, the
Florida Supreme Court has so held. In that case a
board of public instruction, without authority and "without an affirmative vote of the qualified voters being first
had and obtained" purchased a school site, and in part
payment thereof executed and delivered three notes for
$2,000 each. The notes had not been paid, an action had
been brought earlier thereon, and they had been declared
void. In this case the holder of the notes proceeded
against the members of the board personally on the
theory that they were individually liable therefor. The
Supreme Court of Florida allowed recovery on the
theory that the individual members of the board by
issuing the notes without authority to bind the board
thereby, were personally liable in tort to the holder. We
quote from the case:
In the case at bar, there was a clear legal
duty on the defendants, as members of the board
of public instruction of Dade County, to proceed
in a particular way with respect to the issuance
of evidences of indebtedness for the purchase of
school sites. This clear legal duty to proceed in
a particular way to comply with the statutes
implied an equally clear legal duty not to proceed
in any other way, and not to issue evidences of
indebtedness, apparently valid on their face and
having the seal of the board of public instructions
attached thereto, unless the conditions warranting such issuance, had been ascertained by them
beforehand to exist.
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The duty to comply with the indispensable
legal formalities required to be observed in the
issuance of public securities and evidences of
indebtedness, in order to. make them valid and
bind the corporate body or board so issuing them,
is ministerial and non-discretionary in character.
A neglect of that duty by proceeding in a manner
in disregard of the law and to the •special damage
of another not a contributor to the default therefore renders the participants in such illegal conduct liable in damages to the person specially
injured by such omission or neglect. * * *
Ij^the facts as represented to the plaintiff bond
purchaser were not correct, and the bonds therefore
declared void, then either the purchaser or the city will
suffer a loss. Those causing such loss, we submit, should,
where it is caused by their negligence, be compelled to
make the damaged person whole.
There is no evidence in the record to support the
trial court's finding that there was neither negligence nor
misrepresentation on the part of the several individual
defendants who were officers of the defendant Spring
City at the time of the disputed issue. The bonds themselves as well as the preliminary proceedings authorizing their issue disclose a representation which, if these
bonds are held invalid, was false and prejudicial to the
plaintiff. In the First National Bcmk case above cited,
there arose a duty upon those individuals to ascertain
the facts they represented and a presumption that if the
facts as represented were false, there was a liability
in tort to the holder. There is nothing in the record
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which would overcome that presumption if in fact these
bonds are declared to be void.
We especially take exception to the court's finding
(E. p. 42), that the defendants were entitled to rely upon
the opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Utah.
The Attorney General stood in somewhat of an adversary
position, not as counsel for any of the defendants.
Neither were the defendants protected in their reliance
upon their bond brokers or his attorney. Those defendants procured their counsel and if it was incompetent,
they, not their adversary, must suffer adversely from
an unfortunate choice.
We further except to the court's finding that the
plaintiff knew or should have known the financial condition of defendant Spring City (E, p. 41, para's 1 and 2).
We can find no authority for the proposition that one
department of the state is charged with constructive
notice of the acts, conditions, records and affairs of
another department. It would be an onerous burden to
charge each department of government with the acts
and records of every other department.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff and Appellant respectfully contends in summary and conclusion, that the bonds subject of this litigation are constitutional, valid, and collectible. That
there has been no violation of the provisions of the Constitution or of the enabling laws of the State of Utah.
The bonds are not invalid, we contend, for reason
of exceeding the provision for maximum debt of Article
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XIV, Section 3. That at the time of their issuance, they
were within the potential and expected revenues of the
defendant Spring City for the year in which they were
issued. That being valid when issued, they remained
valid and subsisting general obligations of the municipality, although payable in years other than the one in
which the obligation was incurred. They were not, nor
could they be, invalidated by subsequent appropriations,
expenditures, or disbursements of the municipality during the year in which they were issued.
We respectfully contend that the bonds were issued
pursuant to an express statutory authority, which additionally empowered the municipality to collect revenues
for the satisfaction of the debt.
Plaintiff and Appellant further submits that for
money had and received, the Defendant Spring City
ought to be required to repay the full amount paid for
the disputed bonds, including interest and premium;
that the restoration sought may be properly ordered
upon sound principles of the law of restitution, allowing a damaged party to be compensated for amounts
by which another has been unjustly enriched by money
had and received.
It is respectfully urged and contended that, if the
bonds be held invalid, then the Plaintiff and Appellant
ought to be entitled to recover the amount of their
damage from the individual defendants herein, who were,
at the time of the issuance of those bonds, officers of
the defendant Spring City, for reason of their negligent
misrepresentations and recitals as the same were con48
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tained in the proceedings preliminary to the issuance of,
and as contained in, the bonds, and for reason of their
failure to so manage the affairs of the city so as to retain
as valid and subsisting obligations, the securities in
which they had recited and covenanted that the evidences
of debt were lawfully and constitutionally issued, and
within current revenues.
Respectfully submitted,

-

E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
S.D. HUFFAKER
Deputy Attorney General
KEN CHAMBERLAIN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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